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APPLYING SUGGESTIBILITY RESEARCH
TO THE REAL WORLD: THE CASE OF
REPEATED QUESTIONS
THOMAS D. LYON *
I
INTRODUCTION
One can discern two parallel trends in the law and the psychology of child
witnesses.  In the law, appellate courts are beginning to stem the once powerful
movement to increase the acceptance of children’s testimony and the admissi-
bility of children’s out-of-court statements.  In psychology, experimental psy-
chologists are amassing evidence of the potential unreliability of children’s
memory reports.  The trends intersect when courts assess the reliability of chil-
dren’s statements in order to evaluate the competency of child witnesses, to de-
cide whether to admit expert testimony about the suggestibility of children, and
to decide whether to admit children’s hearsay.
This article will analyze particular strands of each trend.  With respect to the
law of the child witness, it will consider the application of the medical diagnosis
hearsay exception to sexual abuse cases, using as a case study State v. Larson,1 a
Minnesota case that made its way to the United States Supreme Court.  The
analysis will show how restrictive application of the medical diagnosis exception
forces courts to confront the dangers of children’s suggestibility.
With respect to the psychology of child witnesses, this article will consider
the application of the research literature on repeated questions to sexual abuse
cases.  It will review the entire corpus of research on repeated questions and
apply that research to State v. Larson.  The article will argue that the risks of
question repetition have been exaggerated.  The leading research on repeated
questions does not support a claim that repetition increases error.  Whether
repetition leads to inconsistency depends on the types of questions asked, the
age of the child, and the child’s memory of the event.  Most important, re-
searchers ignore the potential effects of repetition on false denials, emphasizing
instead the risk that repetition will lead to false allegations.  As a result, the
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cost-benefit calculations called for by policy-minded researchers include only
the costs of repeated questions.
Part II discusses the facts of State v. Larson, the application of the medical
diagnosis exception, and how limiting the exception leads courts to look more
carefully at the potential unreliability of children’s reports.  A key issue in Lar-
son was whether the child’s response to repeated questions could be trusted.
Part III discusses the importance of repeated questions in debates over sug-
gestibility and summarizes the settled view of the dangers of repeated ques-
tions.  Part IV critically reviews the literature, including the factors that affect
the likelihood that repetition leads to inconsistency or error.  Part V discusses
the possibility that repetition will increase the number of true reports of abuse.
The goals of this article are to communicate the specifics of the research for
practical application in future cases and to illustrate the difficulties and poten-
tial drawbacks of applying suggestibility research to real-world cases.
II
STATE V. LARSON: THE MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS EXCEPTION, RELIABILITY,
AND REPEATED QUESTIONS
In State v. Larson,2 Bruce Larson was found guilty of sexually assaulting his
four-year-old daughter in the second degree.  When the child, hereinafter “B.”,
was three years old, she complained to her mother of vaginal soreness and
burning urination.3  Within a week or so, the mother took the child to a family
practice clinic, where the child was examined by a physician’s assistant:4
The physician’s assistant, who conducted the examination, noticed redness and swel-
ling around the vaginal opening.  Suspecting abuse, the examiner asked B. who had
touched her.  B. replied that “Daddy” had touched her with “his bone” that “came out
of his pants.”  B. said it had hurt and that she had asked him to stop.5
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of the
child’s statements to the physician’s assistant under the medical diagnosis ex-
ception to the hearsay rule.6  The court also held that statements the child later
made to other adults qualified under the residual exception to the hearsay rule.7
The child did not testify at the trial.8
The subsequent history of the case illustrates the greater scrutiny courts are
giving children’s allegations of sexual abuse.  The defendant sought review in
the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari and remanded the case,9 in-
structing the Minnesota Supreme Court to reconsider its holding in light of
2. Id.
3. Id. at 43.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 47.
7. Id. at 46-47.
8. Id. at 44.
9. Larson v. Minnesota, 498 U.S. 801 (1990).
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Idaho v. Wright,10 which held that for statements of a non-testifying declarant to
be admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule, the court had to
find that the statements had “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” be-
cause the residual exception is not a “firmly-rooted” exception to the hearsay
rule.11  In Wright, the Supreme Court suggested that trustworthiness could be
guaranteed by, among other things, the “lack of [a] motive to fabricate” and by
the “spontaneity and consistent repetition” of the statements.12
What puzzled the Minnesota Supreme Court on remand was that the most
important hearsay—the child’s statements to the physician’s assistant—had
been admitted under the medical diagnosis exception rather than under the re-
sidual exception.13  Wright said nothing about how statements admitted under
the medical diagnosis exception were to be handled.  The Minnesota Supreme
Court acknowledged Professor Robert Mosteller’s argument that some state-
ments admitted under the medical diagnosis exception do not fall within the
“firmly-rooted” core of the exception, and therefore should be subject to the
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” test.14  Although the court be-
lieved that the child’s statements to the physician’s assistant fell within the
“core” part of the medical diagnosis exception—making an analysis of trustwor-
thiness unnecessary—it proceeded to assess the trustworthiness of the child’s
statements.15
In their briefs on remand, the parties vigorously debated the reliability of
the child’s statements.  Calling the Minnesota Supreme Court’s recitation of
facts “misleading,” the defendant argued that the physician’s assistant admitted
in cross-examination that she “asked the child ‘Did your Daddy touch you’ and
that the child initially answered ‘no’ and then recanted and said ‘yes’.”16  By con-
trast, the State and the court on remand emphasized the physician’s assistant’s
direct testimony and her dictated report,17 which told a different story:
The physician’s assistant, who conducted the examination, saw redness and swelling
around the vaginal opening.  Suspecting abuse, the examiner, after assuring B. that she
was there to “assist her,” asked B. if anyone other than her mother or herself had
touched her vaginal area.  B. initially responded “no” and turned away.  When the ex-
10. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
11. Id. at 816.
12. Id. at 821.
13. State v. Larson, 472 N.W.2d 120, 126 (Minn. 1991).
14. Id. (citing Robert Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of Medical Di-
agnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 257, 260-61 (1989) [hereinafter Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse]).
The defendant had not challenged whether the use of the medical diagnosis exception was “firmly
rooted.”  Appellant’s Brief on Remand From the United States Supreme Court at 6, State v. Larson,
453 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1990) (No. C2-88-2379).  Cf. State v. Jacobsen, No. 96-8-03132-9, 2000 WL
526749, at *5 (Wash. App. 2000) (“ER 803(a)(4) is not a ‘firmly rooted’ hearsay exception when ap-
plied to child hearsay.”); State v. Florczak, 882 P.2d 199, 207 (Wash. App. 1994) (“[I]n the context of
child hearsay, ER 803(a)(4) is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception.”).
15. Larson, 472 N.W.2d at 126.
16. Appellant’s Brief on Remand From the United States Supreme Court at 24-25 n.2, State v. Lar-
son, 453 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1990) (No. C2-88-2379).
17. Respondent’s Brief on Remand From the United States Supreme Court at 6-7, State v. Larson,
453 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1990) (No. C2-88-2379).
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aminer repeated the question, B. said “yes,” that “Daddy” had touched her there.
When the examiner asked whether her daddy had touched her there to help wipe her
or dry her, B. said “yes,” but then, when asked “where,” pointed to her abdomen.
When asked with what he had touched her, B. replied that “Daddy” had touched her
“between [the] legs” with “his bone” that “came out of his pants.”  Asked whether this
had happened before, B. said “yes,” that “he laid me on the couch and he rubbed my
belly. . . until my skin came off.”  B. further stated that it hurt “because he pressed
hard against her tummy and hugged her real hard,” and that she had asked him to
stop.  She further described feeling wet on her abdomen and having to wipe herself
dry afterwards.  Although B. apparently told her mother when the examiner briefly
left the room that she was “only kidding,” B. immediately recanted this to the exam-
iner and explained that “she didn’t want to have her father in trouble.”  Indeed, the
examiner observed that B. was “very nervous and very protective of her father,”
whom B. “obviously loved.”18
The court concluded that the statements enjoyed the “particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness,” in part because “the questions the assistant asked were
not the kind of questions that would prompt a child to fabricate the response
the questions elicited.”19  The more complete treatment of the statements given
by the court on remand, however, raises several questions about the child’s
credibility.  The child only acknowledged touching when the question was re-
peated.  Although the parties disagree, the question may have been as leading
as “Did your Daddy touch you?” The child’s subsequent statements were simi-
larly inconsistent, and she was reluctant to name her father as the perpetrator.20
Nevertheless, the court assumed that repetition of the questions was necessary
to elicit a truthful allegation from the child.21
Under the traditional analysis for the medical diagnosis exception, the court
need not have analyzed the trustworthiness of the statements.  The lesson of
Larson is that if a court is forced to do so, the analysis will raise questions about
children’s suggestibility.22  In some jurisdictions, the medical diagnosis exception
contains an explicit requirement that the court assess the reliability of the
statements before admitting them.23  Courts can also inject reliability questions
by carefully scrutinizing the motives of the child who made the statement.  As-
sessing the child’s motives allows a court to consider whether the statements
were the product of leading or suggestive questioning, rather than a desire to
receive treatment.24
In many jurisdictions, the statements might fail to qualify as having been
made for the purposes of advancing diagnosis or treatment.  One can question
18. Larson, 472 N.W. 2d at 122.
19. Id. at 126.
20. See id. at 127.
21. See id. at 126.
22. See id.
23. See, e.g., State v. Kay, 927 P.2d 897, 908 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) (in applying medical diagnosis
exception to child’s statements, court can consider “factors that otherwise indicate the reliability of the
statements”); MISS. R. EVID. 803(4) (court must find that the “statements were made under circum-
stances substantially indicating their trustworthiness”); N.H. R. EVID. 803(4) (same).
24. See State v. Dever, 64 Ohio St. 3d 401, 410 (1992) (if the statements were “inappropriately in-
fluenced by another, then those statements would not have been made for the purpose of diagnosis or
treatment.”).
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whether a four-year-old child understands the importance of telling the truth to
doctors.25  Some courts have begun to require an affirmative showing that the
child understood the significance of her statements,26 rather than assuming such
understanding.27  Especially problematic is the identification of the perpetrator.28
Under the medical diagnosis exception, statements as to the cause of an injury
must be reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.29  Although some courts
have held that the identity of the perpetrator is relevant in determining the best
course of psychological treatment,30 and in determining whether the child should
be removed from her home,31 other courts have expressed skepticism that these
remedies really constitute “medical” treatment and are covered by the excep-
tion.32  Whether identification of the perpetrator is medically relevant from the
child’s perspective can also be questioned.33
25. Indeed, the defendant argued on appeal in Larson that a four-year-old child “probably does
not understand the importance or need to speak truthfully with a physician which is the fundamental
principle behind this exception.”  Appellant’s Brief on Remand From the United States Supreme Court
at 25 n.2, State v. Larson, 453 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1990) (No. C2-88-2379).  See Mosteller, Child Sexual
Abuse, supra note 14, at 293 (“The age and mental maturity of the child may attenuate the selfish inter-
est of the declarant so profoundly as to virtually eliminate any trustworthiness guarantee under the ra-
tionale of this exception.”); 2 JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES §
7.41 at 294 (3d ed. 1997) (“When the [diagnosis or treatment] exception is applied to young children,
the developmental fit may not be very good, raising legitimate questions about young children’s under-
standing of the need for truthfulness with the doctor, and casting doubt on the reliability of certain
statements by young children.”).  Recent research has suggested that young children are actually quite
good at recognizing the role of medical professionals in providing treatment, and, contrary to common
belief, do not believe that illness and treatment are forms of punishment.  See Melody R. Herbst, Mar-
garet S. Steward, John E.B. Myers & Robin L. Hansen, Young Children’s Understanding of the Physi-
cian’s Role and the Medical Hearsay Exception, in CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING OF BIOLOGY AND
HEALTH 235 (Michael Siegal & Candida C. Peterson eds., 1999); Pamela M. Kato, Thomas D. Lyon &
Christina Rasco, Reasoning About Moral Aspects of Illness and Treatment by Preschoolers Who are
Healthy or Who Have Chronic Illness, 19 DEVELOPMENTAL & BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 68 (1998).
26. See, e.g., State v. Hinnant, 523 S.E.2d 663, 669 (N.C. 2000) (“[T]he proponent of Rule 803(4)
testimony must affirmatively establish that the declarant . . . made the statements understanding that
they would lead to medical diagnosis or treatment.”); United States v. Sumner, 204 F.3d 1182, 1185 (8th
Cir. 2000) (“[I]t must be shown that the child understands the ‘medical significance of being truthful.’”).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco, 154 F.3d 1236, 1241 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he defendant had
failed to point to any actual evidence to show the victim did not understand she was seeking medical
treatment.”).
28. Surveying the case law, Robert Mosteller argues that, “if what is required is consensus rather
than majority view, that consensus is that, in criminal cases, statements identifying the abuser do not fit
within” the exception.  Robert Mosteller, The Maturation and Disintegration of the Hearsay Exception
for Statements for Medical Examination in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47
[hereinafter Mosteller, Maturation].  Cf. MYERS, supra note 25, § 7.39, at 279 (“A small minority of
courts reject statements identifying the perpetrator.”).
29. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).  According to the advisory committee notes, statements as to fault are
usually not pertinent.  FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee’s note.
30. See, e.g., People v. Falaster, 670 N.E.2d 624, 629 (Ill. 1996) (quoting United States v. Renville,
779 F.2d 430, 437 (8th Cir. 1985) (“The exact nature and extent of the psychological problems which
ensue from child abuse often depend on the identity of the abuser.”)).
31. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801, 810 (Ariz. 1987) (“[E]ffective treatment may require
that the victim avoid contact with the abuser, not just to prevent future abuse, but also to facilitate re-
covery from past abuse.”).
32. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 625 So. 2d 821, 825-26 (Fla. 1993) (rejecting identification of perpetra-
tor under medical diagnosis exception).  Cf. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
LYON_FMT.DOC 12/05/01  11:25 AM
102 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 65: No. 1
In states that restrict application of the medical diagnosis exception, prose-
cutors often seek to admit the statements under other exceptions, most com-
monly the residual exception, or, in many states, under a special exception for
children’s allegations of abuse.  These other exceptions always require a close
look at reliability.  Under the residual exception, statements must have
“equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” (that is, equivalent to
other exceptions).34  Under most versions of the special child abuse exception, a
court must find that the statement evinces “indicia of reliability.”35  If the child
declarant does not testify, statements admitted under either exception must be
shown to enjoy “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” to pass muster
under the Confrontation Clause, because neither exception is “firmly rooted.”36
When an analysis of reliability is added to the usual consideration—whether a
statement was made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment—the potential
suggestibility of the child comes to the fore.
At the same time that courts are taking a closer look at the reliability of
young children’s hearsay, researchers have focused on the suggestibility of pre-
schoolers.  Since Bruce Larson was originally convicted, a massive amount of
research has been conducted on children’s suggestibility.  At first glance, the
case appears to be a good candidate for a suggestibility defense.  The child was
three years old when she first accused her father of abuse.37  Suggestibility re-
searchers have shown that preschool children are particularly vulnerable to
suggestive influences.38  At the time the allegations surfaced, Larson and his
EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES, § 8.42 at 942 (2d ed. 1999) (identification aids in “provid-
ing social remedies” rather than medical treatment).
33. See Mosteller, Maturation, supra note 28, at 62 (“The typical reasonable person/declarant
would not likely consider a statement to a doctor identifying the perpetrator of a sexual assault to be
critical to proper medical treatment.”); Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 14, at 277 n.83 (“Be-
fore identification statements . . . are included as ancillary to other statements motivated by the declar-
ant’s selfish interest, the prosecution should make a real showing that the declarant had such a subjec-
tive recognition of the overall significance of her statements.”).
34. FED. R. EVID. 807.
35. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (2000) (requiring that “the time, content, and
circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability”); MYERS, supra note 25, § 7.53,
at 355 (“Most child hearsay exceptions are modeled on the Washington formula.”).
36. See MYERS, supra note 25, § 7.61, at 400 (“Child hearsay exceptions are specialized residual
exceptions, and are not firmly rooted.”); Swan v. Peterson, 6 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[e]nacted
in 1982, [Washington’s child sexual abuse hearsay] exception is relatively new and not firmly rooted.”);
State v. Robinson, 722 P.2d 1379, 1385 (Wash. App. 1986) (stating that Washington’s child sexual abuse
hearsay exception “is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception”).  But see Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D.
Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 33, 94 n.216 (2000) (“It is an unresolved question whether ‘tender years’ exceptions such as
Washington’s will be deemed to be ‘firmly rooted’ and so to satisfy the Confrontation Clause without a
need for individualized inquiry into trustworthiness.”).
37. See State v. Larson, 472 N.W. 2d 120, 122 (Minn. 1991).
38. See, e.g., Peter A. Ornstein & Betty N. Gordon, The Psychologist as Expert Witness: A Com-
ment, in EXPERT WITNESSES IN CHILD ABUSE CASES: WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE SAID IN COURT
237, 244 (Stephen J. Ceci & H. Hembrooke eds., 1998) (“A growing body of work indicates that young
children (particularly pre-schoolers) are especially vulnerable to external influences in the form of
misleading or suggestive information.”); Karen J. Saywitz & Thomas D. Lyon, Coming to Grips with
Children’s Suggestibility, in MEMORY AND SUGGESTIBILITY IN THE FORENSIC INTERVIEW (M.L.
Eisen, G.S. Goodman & J.A. Quas eds., forthcoming 2001) (copy on file with author).  Cf. Debra A.
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wife were divorced and she had custody of the child.39  Suggestibility researchers
emphasize the dangers of pressure from adults in abuse allegations arising after
divorce.40  The child was interviewed by a number of professionals over the
course of several months.41  Suggestibility researchers warn against multiple
suggestive interviews over an extended period.42
On the other hand, much of the research on children’s suggestibility does
not appear to fit the facts of this case.  In Larson, the mother did not initiate the
examination because of suspicions of abuse, there was no evidence of coaching,
and the child was more willing to talk about the abuse with the physician’s assis-
tant than with the mother.  Although the child was young and thus vulnerable
to leading questions, the physician’s assistant was the first to question the child,
there was no use of anatomical dolls,43 and no peer pressure.  No one argued
that the physician’s assistant had selectively reinforced the child’s responses;44
she asked about sexual touching but also inquired about innocent touching.
There was no evidence of stereotype induction—telling the child that her father
was a bad man.45  Indeed, the child clearly showed positive feelings for her fa-
ther.46  Subsequent interviews were subject to many of these problems,47 but the
child’s initial statements to the physician’s assistant were clearly the most
damning.48  The defense needed to undermine the reliability of the child’s first
statements to argue that subsequent interviews created the allegations, rather
than merely sustained them.
Poole & Michael E. Lamb, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF CHILDREN: A GUIDE FOR HELPING
PROFESSIONALS 58 (1998) (“Although authors frequently comment that preschool children make more
errors than older children or adults, suggestibility to misleading questions declines gradually well into
the school years.”).
39. See Larson, 472 N.W. 2d at 122.
40. See, e.g., Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36, at 59 (“Many experts can cite cases—in acrimonious
disputes, for example—in which one parent is accused of coaching the child against the other parent.”).
41. See Larson, 472 N.W. 2d at 122-23.
42. See, e.g., Maggie Bruck et al., Reliability and Credibility of  Young Children’s Reports: From
Research to Policy and Practice, 53 AM. PSYCHOL. 136, 141 (1998) (“[C]hild witnesses are often inter-
viewed over a prolonged period of time, and they are reinterviewed on many occasions about the same
set of suspected events.”).
43. See Maggie Bruck et al.,  Anatomically Detailed Dolls Do Not Facilitate Preschoolers’ Reports
of a Pediatric Examination Involving Genital Touching, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 95
(1995); Maggie Bruck, Children’s Use of Anatomically Detailed Dolls to Report Genital Touching in a
Medical Examination: Developmental and Gender Comparisons, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
APPLIED 74 (2000).
44. See Sena Garven et al., More Than Suggestion: The Effect of Interviewing Techniques From the
McMartin Preschool Case, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 347 (1998) [hereinafter Garven et al., More Than
Suggestion]; Sena Garven et al., Allegations of Wrongdoing: The Effects of Reinforcement on Children’s
Mundane and Fantastic Claims, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 38 (2000) [hereinafter Garven et al., Allega-
tions of Wrongdoing].
45. See Michelle D. Leichtman & Stephen J. Ceci, The Effects of Stereotypes and Suggestions on
Preschoolers’ Reports, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 568 (1995).
46. See Larson, 472 N.W. 2d at 122-23.
47. See Larson, 472 N.W. 2d at 123 (stating that therapist interviewed child with anatomically de-
tailed dolls); see id. at 127 (stating that child protection specialist interviewed child with anatomically
detailed dolls); id. (stating that police officer, who questioned child with social worker, asked “leading
questions that began with the premise that ‘Daddy hurt’ B.”).
48. See id. at 126 (“Of B’s statements, those made to the physician’s assistant clearly were key.”).
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What appears to be most problematic about the physician’s assistant’s ques-
tioning was that she repeated her question after the child’s initial denial that in-
appropriate touching had occurred.  Suggestibility researchers contend that
young children will change their answer to questions if the questions are re-
peated within an interview.49  A central issue in Larson is whether repeating
questions may have led to a false allegation of abuse.
III
THE IMPORTANCE OF QUESTION REPETITION AND COMMON WISDOM
REGARDING ITS DANGERS
The issue of question repetition is of special interest for several reasons.
First, there are many factors that cause interviewers to repeat questions when
interviewing children.  In addition to repeating questions in response to appar-
ent reluctance on the part of the child to report abuse, interviewers repeat ques-
tions to elicit additional information, to clarify ambiguous responses, and be-
cause of their uncertainty (or forgetfulness) over whether a topic was covered.
Although there is some debate regarding whether the highly suggestive tech-
niques used in several infamous day care cases and mimicked in several well-
known studies are typical of mundane sexual abuse investigations,50 question
repetition is quite common.  Amye Warren and her colleagues examined the
transcripts of forty-two videotaped investigative interviews and found that, in
ninety-five percent of the interviews, the interviewer repeated a question that
had been unambiguously answered by the child in the immediately preceding
portion of the interview; seven percent of all questions were repeated.51
Second, if simply repeating a question undermines the reliability of a child’s
testimony, this may justify expert testimony on the suggestibility of children.
When suggestibility experts testify in court that children are more suggestible
than adults, or that highly coercive interviewing techniques increase error, they
are repeating what most lay people already believe, making it questionable
whether the expert testimony is helpful to the jury.52  On the other hand, the ef-
49. See Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, Children’s Testimony: Applied and Basic Issues, in 4
HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOL. 713, 740 (I.E. Sigel & K.A. Renninger eds., 5th ed. 1998) [hereinafter
Ceci & Bruck, Children’s Testimony]; Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36, at 53.
50. See Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36, at 57-70; Lyon, supra note 25, at 1033-42; Amye Warren et
al., Setting the Record Straight: How Problematic are “Typical” Child Sexual Abuse Interviews?, Paper
presented at the biennial meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society (March 2000) (on file with
author) (concluding that “the assumptions made by Lyon (1999) about the rarity of some of the most
egregious interviewing practices (e.g. referring to what other people have said) in ‘typical’ interviews
may be well founded,” but adding several “caveats” regarding the representativeness of the interviews,
the coding system, and the fact that even infrequent use of some suggestive methods is problematic);
Garven et al., More Than Suggestion, supra note 44, at 354-55 (“[T]he interviewing techniques from the
McMartin case should not be viewed as typical of the practice in most child protection and law en-
forcement agencies.”).
51. Warren et al., supra note 50; see also Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36, at 66 n.168 (discussing
Warren’s results).
52. See Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36, at 100 (“One can easily accept the proposition—which
Lyon supports with survey evidence—that many, even most, potential jurors understand that children
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fects of mere repetition may strike jurors as surprising.53  Expert input may also
help courts consider the reliability of children’s out-of-court statements when
assessing their admissibility.  The courts have some understanding of the dan-
gers of repetition; they consider whether the child’s statements are spontaneous
or are the product of repeated questions in applying the excited utterance hear-
say exception54 and the residual or catch-all exception.55  They might be sur-
prised, however, by the magnitude of the effects of repeating questions.  The
case law reveals that expert opinions discussing the negative effects of repeated
questions have reached the courts through expert testimony,56 through amicus
briefs, and through researchers’ published writings.57  Indeed, in Larson, an ex-
pert testifying before the recent research on suggestibility criticized the use of
repeated questions within interviews.58
Researchers have characterized repeating questions as a “highly suggestive”
technique59 and as a “very powerful suggestive manipulation.”60  Stephen Ceci
are more suggestible than adults, and yet recognize the value of expert evidence”); Thomas D. Lyon,
The New Wave in Children’s Suggestibility Research: A Critique, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1004 (1999)
[hereinafter Lyon, New Wave] (responding to Ceci and Bruck’s claim that nonexperts are less likely to
recognize children’s weaknesses than their strengths by citing “[v]arious surveys of jury-eligible citi-
zens” that “demonstrate that jurors are well aware of the potential for suggestibility”); Michael R.
Leippe & Ann Romanczyk, Children on the Witness Stand: A Communication/Persuasion Analysis of
Jurors’ Reactions to Child Witnesses, in CHILDREN’S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 155, 159 (Stephen J. Ceci
et al. eds., 1987) (noting that a survey of parents and college students found that the majority of re-
spondents [77%] saw five- to nine-year-old children as more suggestible than adults when the influence
agent is an adult); David F. Ross et al., Age Stereotypes, Communication Modality, and Mock Jurors’
Perceptions of the Child Witness, in PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY 37, 38 (Stephen J. Ceci
et al. eds., 1989) (providing a survey of college students showing they “believed the child witness,
whether six or eight years old, was less likely to be accurate and more likely to be open to suggestion
than witness of adult age (either young or old))”; A. Daniel Yarmey & Hazel P. Tressillian Jones, Is the
Psychology of Eyewitness Identification a Matter of Common Sense?, in EVALUATING WITNESS
EVIDENCE, RECENT PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND NEW PERSPECTIVES 13, 33 & tbl. 2.15 (Sally
M.A. Lloyd Bostock & Brian R. Clifford eds., 1983) (finding that 47% of citizens eligible to be jurors
said an eight-year-old would answer questions by police or in court “the way he/she thinks the ques-
tioner wants him to,” 23% said the child would say “I don’t know” or refuse to respond to questions,
and 30% said the child would “reply accurately”).
53. See Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36, at 101 n.286 (arguing that many jurors will not recognize
the effects of repeated questions); Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Wit-
ness Credibility, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 181 (1989) (“[J]urors probably fail to take [effects of
repeated questions] into account.”).
54. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vining, 744 A.2d 310, 317-18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
55. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801, 814 (Ariz. 1987).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Rouse, 111 F.3d 561, 571 (8th Cir. 1997); State v. Slane, 1999 WL
961453, at *11 (Ohio App. 1999).
57. See, e.g., State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1377 (N.J. 1994) (“When a child is asked a question
and gives an answer, and the question is immediately asked again, the child’s normal reaction is to as-
sume that the first answer was wrong or displeasing to the adult questioner”) (citing Debra A. Poole &
Lawrence T. White, Effects of Question Repetition on the Eyewitness Testimony of Children and Adults,
27 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 975 (1991) [hereinafter Poole & White, Question Repetition]); Rouse,
111 F.3d at 576 (Bright, J., dissenting) (citing Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, The Suggestibility of the
Child Witness: A Historical Review and Synthesis, 113 Psychol. Bull. 403 (1993) [hereinafter Ceci &
Bruck, Suggestibility]) (“Repeated questions can produce a change of answers as the child may inter-
pret the question as ‘I must not have given the correct response the first time.’”).
58. Appellant’s Brief on Remand From the United States Supreme Court at 30-31 n.2, State v. Lar-
son, 453 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1990) (No. C2-88-2379).
59. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36, at 53.
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and Maggie Bruck, two of the most prominent suggestibility researchers, report
that “a number of studies, from different domains, demonstrate that when
young children are asked the same question more than once within an inter-
view, they change their answer.”61  Stephen Ceci and Richard Friedman, re-
viewing the suggestibility research for a legal audience, argue that preschool
children are disproportionately likely to change their answers to questions such
as “Did he touch you there?” merely upon repetition of the question.62
Researchers have offered two reasons why children are likely to change
their answers when questions are repeated.  First, children believe that their
first answer must have been incorrect.63  Second, children assume that the adult
questioner is unhappy with the answer, and they change their answer to please
the adult.64
When one turns from research to policy, the research on repeated ques-
tioning has implications for those who interview children and those who evalu-
ate child interviews.  The interviewer who weighs the advantages and disadvan-
tages of questioning techniques must consider whether to repeat questions in
order to elicit an abuse report.  Suggestibility researchers implicitly agree that
the disadvantages outweigh any advantages, because interviewers are warned to
avoid repeating closed-ended questions within an interview.65  A court evaluat-
ing the reliability of a child’s statement must consider the effects of repeated
questions on the accuracy of the child’s report.  Suggestibility researchers  be-
lieve that repetition undermines the reliability of children’s statements.  In dis-
cussing when a child’s hearsay statement might be sufficiently reliable, Ceci and
Friedman posit a child who, “without any prompting, articulates a detailed and
plausible account of abuse soon after the alleged event, and, still without
prompting, consistently adheres to that account.”66
60. Johann Endres, Claudia Poggenpohl & Christina Erben, Repetitions, Warnings, and Video:
Cognitive and Motivational Components in Preschool Children’s Suggestibility, 4 LEGAL &
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 129, 133 (1999).
61. Ceci & Bruck, Children’s Testimony, supra note 49, at 740.
62. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36, at 101 n.286.
63. See Robyn Fivush & April Schwarzmueller, Say it Once Again: Effects of Repeated Questions
on Children’s Event Recall, 8 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 555, 573 (1995) (“When asked the same question
within the same interview, young children seem to interpret the repetition as an indication that their
initial response was wrong, and therefore they change their answer”); Ceci & Bruck, Children’s Testi-
mony, supra note 49, at 740 (“The first answer I gave must be wrong, that is why they are asking me the
question again”).
64. See STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK, JEOPARDY IN THE COURTROOM: A SCIENTIFIC
ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY 120 (1995) [hereinafter CECI & BRUCK, JEOPARDY] (“At
other times, children may change their answer to please the adult who is questioning them.”); Fried-
land, supra note 53, at 181; Philip J. Kinsler, Children in Court: What Do We Now Know? 24 VT. BAR J.
& L. DIG. 47, 48 (Dec. 1998).
65. See Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36, at 86; Lynne Celander De Sarbo, The Danger of Value-
Laden Investigation in Sexual Abuse Cases: Are Defendants’ Constitutional Rights Violated When Men-
tal Health Professionals Offer Testimony Based on Children’s Hearsay Statements and Behaviors?,  2 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 276, 285 (1999), citing Lucy S. McGough & Amye R. Warren, The All-Important In-
vestigative Interview, 45 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 13 (1994).
66. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36, at 96 (emphasis added).
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IV
A CLOSER LOOK: THE EFFECTS OF REPETITION
In applying research on repeated questions to a particular case, one must
move beyond general statements about how repetition undermines children’s
reliability.  Application of research to real cases requires a careful assessment of
the research methodology, the participants’  characteristics, and the research re-
sults, as well as an evaluation of the interviewing technique and the child inter-
viewed.  Experts must be forthright about the “boundary conditions” of the re-
search, which potentially limit the extent to which the research findings can be
applied to a particular case.67  Social scientists commonly refer to these ques-
tions as issues of external validity, which concerns the extent to which research
results apply to other people, in other situations, and at other times.
A court assesses the boundary conditions or external validity of research
when it decides whether an expert’s proferred testimony sufficiently “fits” the
facts of a case to be helpful to the jury, or whether it is helpful to the judge in
assessing the admissibility of evidence.  Exact fit is not required, and experts
may exercise their best judgment as to how the research applies.  Research that
is inapplicable to a particular case, however, is likely to mislead the finder of
fact and should be excluded.68
A number of factors influence the potential effects of question repetition
upon children’s reliability.  Here, the focus will be on the most important fac-
tors, which include whether questions were repeated within an interview (or
over repeated interviews), the types of questions asked, the child’s age, and the
child’s memory of the event.  The leading research reveals that question repeti-
tion does not inevitably increase error.
A. Repeating Questions Versus Repeating Interviews
In their overview of the literature, Ceci and Friedman discuss five studies
“focusing on repeated questions” that find high rates of error in response to
abuse-related questions.69  A careful reading of Ceci and Friedman’s paper re-
veals that only one of those studies analyzed the effects of repeating questions
within an interview, rather than across interviews.70  The distinction between re-
67. See CECI & BRUCK, JEOPARDY, supra note 64, at 273 (“In short, we urge expert witnesses to
review the full corpus of relevant scientific work, describing the magnitude of errors, the inconsistencies
within and across studies, and the boundary conditions that might limit any generalization from the sci-
ence to the case at bar); Ornstein & Gordon, supra note 38, at 242 (“‘boundary conditions’ may inter-
fere with general statements about the sequelae of abuse or the suggestibility of children, requiring the
expert to say that ‘X may hold under certain conditions, but Y may be true in other situations.’”).
68. See generally Thomas D. Lyon, Expert Testimony on the Suggestibility of Children: Does it Fit?,
in CHILDREN AND THE LAW: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND POLICY (B.L. Bottoms et al. eds.) (forthcoming
2002, available at http://hal-law.usc.edu/users/tlyon/articles/bottoms.pdf) [hereinafter Lyon, Expert Tes-
timony].
69. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36, at 55.
70. When the authors specifically refer to “repetition of questions within the same interview,” they
cite one of the five studies: the 1991 study by Poole and White, discussed at length infra text accompa-
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peating questions within interviews rather than across interviews is important.71
Repeated questions within interviews may lead to error because of the child’s
perception that a different response is expected.  Repeating questions across in-
terviews may also lead to increased error, but for different reasons: Children
forget over time, so that later interviews are more error-filled, and children may
confuse what actually occurred with their responses in earlier interviews.  On
the other hand, repeating questions across interviews may decrease error.
Repetition is a form of rehearsal, which strengthens memory, and children may
recall new details during subsequent interviews (something memory researchers
call “reminiscence”).72  Therefore, errors across interviews do not tell us
whether children will err within an interview.
B. The Leading Research: Poole and White
The study that speaks directly to the issue of repeated questions within in-
terviews was conducted by Debra Poole and Lawrence Wright.73  As Ceci and
Friedman summarize the study, “Poole & White interviewed some four-, six-,
and eight-year-olds, and adults immediately after a staged encounter with a
man, and again one week later.”74  In each interview, questions were repeated
twice, so that they were asked a total of three times over one interview, and six
times over two interviews.  Summarizing the findings, Ceci and Friedman note
that repetition of the question “Did the man hurt Melanie?” increased the like-
lihood of a “false affirmative answer” among the four-year-olds.  Indeed, sixty
percent of the subjects to whom the question was asked six times over two in-
terviews ultimately answered “yes.”75
It is immediately apparent that the Poole and White study differs from the
situation in Larson.  Poole and White examined repetition over two interviews,
rather than one, and asked the question six times, rather than twice.  Neverthe-
less, a sixty percent rate of false affirmation is alarming, particularly since the
question is arguably “abuse-related.”76  Moreover, the study is cited more gen-
erally as demonstrating age differences in the consistency of responses to re-
peated questioning, with young children most inclined to change their answers.77
Should this study lead the court to find the child’s statements unreliable in
Larson?  Or, if the court admits the statements, does the study justify expert
nying notes 73-84.  They also cite the two-year followup to the Poole and White study, discussed infra
text accompanying notes 85-91. Id. at 53.
71. See, e.g., Fivush & Schwarzmueller, supra note 63, at 568 (“questions asked repeatedly during
the same interview session may be perceived differently than the same question asked again on differ-
ent recall occasions”).
72. See id. at 556 (describing how repeated interviews might improve memory).
73. Poole & White, Question Repetition, supra note 57. This is perhaps the most oft-cited study re-
garding question repetition within interviews.
74. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36, at 55.
75. Id. at 52.
76. Id. at 57.
77. See Ceci & Bruck, Children’s Testimony, supra note 49, at 740; Poole & Lamb, supra note 38, at
56; Fivush & Schwarzmueller, supra note 63, at 570.
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testimony that repeated questioning will lead to false affirmations about harm-
ful touching?  Several important details about the Poole and White study sug-
gest negative answers to both questions.
First, a “yes” response to “Did the man hurt Melanie?” is not a “false af-
firmation.”  Rather, it is entirely reasonable to conclude that the man did hurt
Melanie.  Poole and White intentionally staged the event so that “whether
Melanie had actually been injured or was simply discouraging” the man and
“whether the interaction was predominately antagonistic” were “ambiguous
features.”78  Second, children were no more likely than adults to view the inter-
action as harmful.  The researchers found no evidence that “younger subjects
were more or less prone to report that injury had occurred or that inappropriate
behavior was witnessed.”79  In part, this finding emphasizes the ambiguity of the
interaction, because adults were just as unsure as children about what had oc-
curred.  Third, subjects tended to minimize the extent to which a harmful inter-
action occurred.  The researchers believed that the question, “Did the man ask
nicely for the pen?” was unambiguous “because the assistant inappropriately
grabbed the pen from the subject.”  Nevertheless, “many subjects were reluc-
tant to say anything unflattering about the stranger.”80  Poole and White suggest
that either subjects were making judgments based on the overall actions of the
man, or that “there is implicit social pressure involved in reporting antisocial
behavior.”81  Subjects’ denial that the man acted anti-socially, either by grabbing
the pen or hurting the woman, is evidence of false denial rather than false af-
firmation.  Hence, the study raises concerns that subjects might conceal wrong-
doing by another person because of their reluctance to accuse that person of
doing wrong.
The researchers found that younger children (four-year-olds) were more
likely to change their responses to yes/no questions than were older children
and adults.82  Four-year-olds changed their responses eight to sixteen percent of
the time when questions were repeated, whereas six-year-olds and older sub-
jects did so only one to two of the time.83  Given the ambiguity of the interac-
78. Poole & White, Question Repetition, supra note 57, at 977.
79. Id. at 981.  Specifically, adult subjects who answered the question six times were no less likely
than children who answered the question six times to claim that the man had hurt Melanie.  A careful
reader would detect this fact in Ceci and Friedman’s paper.  In the text, the authors refer to the ten-
dency of the “four-year-olds” to give a false affirmative answer, Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36, at 56,
whereas in a footnote they report percentages and note that they apply “[r]egardless of the subjects’
age and gender.”  Id. at 56 n.115.
80. Poole & White, Question Repetition, supra note 57, at 984.
81. Id. at 984.
82. Yes/no questions are questions that can be answered “yes” or “no,” for example, “Did the man
ask nicely for the pen?”
83. Poole & White, Question Repetition, supra note 57, at 981.  The authors report that “[a]cross
both repeat and single-delayed conditions, 24% of the four-year-olds were inconsistent on at least one
yes/no question, compared with only 6% of the older subjects.” Id. at 980-81.  This figure is necessarily
higher than the likelihood of inconsistency per question, because children were asked two yes/no ques-
tions.  Moreover, this figure appears to include not only inconsistencies due to repetition but also in-
consistencies across the two interviews.
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tion, however, the researchers cautiously concluded that “[m]ore research is
needed to determine whether the repetition of yes-no questions is generally
problematic for preschoolers or whether inconsistencies will be apparent only
for minor details or ambiguous interactions.”84
Poole and White returned two years later and re-interviewed many of the
original subjects. 85  As before, questions were repeated; this time subjects were
asked each question a total of three times.  Not surprisingly, many children re-
membered little of the one-minute interaction they had witnessed two years
earlier.86  Summaries of the follow-up study have emphasized the age differ-
ences in errors: Younger children performed less well than older children and
adults,87 even in response to open-ended questions; one-fifth of the children con-
fused which actors performed certain actions;88 and children were more likely to
speculate in response to some questions than adults.  Yet, for our purposes, the
most important question is whether younger children were more likely than
older children and adults to change their answers in response to repeated ques-
tions.  The answer is no.  Across both studies, subjects changed their answer
when the question was repeated about five percent of the time.89  The research-
ers report being “extremely surprised that question repetition was not associ-
ated with decreased accuracy, particularly given the fact that the youngest chil-
dren were only four years old when they witnessed the event.”90
The follow-up study found further evidence that subjects, particularly chil-
dren, are reluctant to label behavior as anti-social.  Although they were no
more likely than adults to change their responses within the interview, children
were more likely than adults to change their responses across interviews, that is,
from the interviews shortly after the original event to the interviews two years
after the event.  The direction of their change was significant: about ninety per-
cent of the time, children who changed their responses “initially reported that
the man behaved badly but later claimed that he had not.”91  The researchers
found evidence that these children had forgotten the interaction, which suggests
that a child who does not remember an event is not prone to report that event
as anti-social, even if questions are repeated.
The two Poole and White studies provide little evidence that non-abused
children are likely to fabricate abuse allegations in response to repeated yes/no
84. Id. at 984.
85. Debra A. Poole & Lawrence T. White, Two Years Later: Effects of Question Repetition and
Retention Interval on the Eyewitness Testimony of Children and Adults, 29 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 844 (1993) [hereinafter Poole & White, Two Years Later].
86. See Poole & White, Question Repetition, supra note 57, at 977 (“the interaction between assis-
tants was very brief, lasting less than a minute”).
87. See Ceci & Bruck, Suggestibility, supra note 57, at 420.
88. See CECI & BRUCK, JEOPARDY, supra note 64, at 108-09.
89. See Poole & White, Two Years Later, supra note 83, at 847 (“the mean consistency score within
a session was 1.91 out of a maximum score of 2”).
90. Id. at 851.  See also id. at 849 (“There was no evidence that testimony became proportionately
less accurate with repetition in Study 2.”).
91. Id. at 847-48.
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questions.  Although the youngest children in the first study were more likely
than older subjects to change their answers when questions were repeated, the
follow-up study found no distinction among age groups.  Even in the first study,
the youngest subjects were no more likely than adults to claim after repeated
questions that something anti-social had occurred.  Rather, the studies suggest
that children, like adults, are reluctant to accuse others of wrongdoing, at least
when the interaction is ambiguous or difficult to recall.  These findings do not
argue against the reliability of an abuse allegation in response to a repeated
question.
C. The Classic Research: Piaget and His Detractors
Poole and White’s work is not the only research upon which reviewers have
relied in arguing that repetition breeds inconsistency and error.  Indeed, the no-
tion that repeated questions elicit changes in children’s responses is a long-
standing one, dating back to research in the 1970s criticizing some of Jean
Piaget’s classic studies.  Researchers argued that some of Piaget’s findings were
attributable to the fact that he repeated questions, eliciting inconsistent re-
sponses from young children.  Suggestibility researchers have widely cited the
research challenging Piaget’s results to support the claim that repetition in-
creases errors.92  Careful scrutiny of that research, however, reveals that there
are important limits to the effects of repetition.
In order to understand the research, it is necessary to understand a little
about Piaget’s developmental theories.  Piaget argued that young children fail
to conserve number, mass, and volume.  For example, with respect to the con-
servation of number, Piaget argued that young children do not understand that
if one changes the spacing of a row of objects, the number of objects does not
change.93  In a number conservation study, an experimenter shows a child two
rows of objects that are equal in number and spaced similarly.  The experi-
menter asks the child if one row has more objects or if they are both the same.94
The experimenter then spreads out one of the rows and repeats the question.
Younger children tend to change their answers, first responding that the rows
are equal, but the—after the experimenter’s manipulation—responding that the
transformed row has more objects.
92. See Ceci & Bruck, Suggestibility, supra note 57, at 419; Amina Memon & Rita Vartoukian, The
Effects of Repeated Questioning on Young Children’s Eyewitness Testimony, 87 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 403
(1996); Poole & White, Question Repetition, supra note 57, at 975; Debra A. Poole & Lawrence T.
White, Tell Me Again and Again: Stability and Change in the Repeated Testimonies of Children and
Adults, in MEMORY AND TESTIMONY IN THE CHILD WITNESS 24, 36 (Maria S. Zaragoza et al. eds.,
1995) [hereinafter Poole & White, Tell Me Again]; Christine M. Ricci & Carole R. Beal, Effect of
Questioning Techniques and Interview Setting on Young Children’s Eyewitness Memory, 6 EXPERT
EVIDENCE 127, 128 (1998).
93. See JEAN PIAGET, THE CHILD’S CONCEPTION OF NUMBER (Caleb Gattegno & F.M. Hodgson
trans., Hermitage Press 1952).
94. The question could be phrased as a yes/no question (“Do these rows have the same number?”)
or as a forced-choice question (“Are there the same number in both rows or does one have more?”).
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Piaget’s interpretation of his results was challenged by researchers who ar-
gued that a child in the conservation experiment might “feel that the second
question itself seems to suggest that a new judgment is in order, with the result
that he changes his answer.”95  Susan Rose and Marion Blank found that if first
graders were asked whether the rows were equal only once—after the trans-
formation occurred, the number of conservation errors was cut in half.96  Other
researchers replicated Rose and Blank’s findings on number conservation for
the other conservation tasks—volume, mass, and length.97  Moreover, Michael
Siegal and his colleagues showed that children interpreted the repetition of the
question as a request for a different answer.  Siegal’s research team found that
when four- to six-year-old participants watched puppets making errors on the
standard conservation task, they tended to attribute those errors to the puppet’s
desire “to please the grownup” rather than what “the puppet really thought was
true.”98
At first glance, the implications of the research for children’s eyewitness
memory seem clear: Merely repeating the conservation question appears to
elicit errors in young children.  If children err when responding about objects
they are currently viewing, then surely they will err in responding about events
they are trying to remember.
Consider, however, the context in which repetition occurs in the conserva-
tion experiment.  The researcher asks the child a question, transforms the mate-
rials, and then asks the question again.  The repetition is coupled with transfor-
mation of the objects.  If repeating the question tells a child that her first answer
was incorrect, repetition alone (either before or after transformation) should
have equally deleterious effects.  Several researchers have found that this is not
the case.  Studying three- to four-year-olds,  Graeme Halford and Frances
Boyle asked two number-conservation questions without manipulating the ob-
jects between questions; the experimenter asked the question, dropped some-
thing on the floor, and then repeated the question.99  The authors found that
“the preschool children seem to have no difficulty maintaining their judgment
when they are requested to repeat it without seeing a transformation.”100
Whereas children changed their answers about half the time in the standard ex-
periment, they did so 12.5% of the time when the question was simply re-
95. Susan A. Rose & Marion Blank, The Potency of Context in Children’s Cognition: An Illustra-
tion Through Conservation, 45 CHILD DEV. 499, 500 (1974).
96. Id. (“[E]rrors on conservation were more than halved on the one-judgment task relative to the
other two tasks.”).
97. See Judith Samuel & Peter Bryant, Asking Only One Question in the Conservation Experiment,
25 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY & ALLIED DISCIPLINES 315 (1984) (conservation of mass,
number, and volume); Michael Siegal, Lorraine J. Waters & Leigh S. Dinwiddy, Misleading Children:
Causal Attributions For Inconsistency Under Repeated Questioning, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD
PSYCHOL. 438 (1988) (conservation of number and length).
98. Siegal, Waters & Dinwiddy, supra note 97, at 445.
99. Graeme S. Halford & Frances M. Boyle, Do Young Children Understand Conservation of
Number?, 56 CHILD DEV. 165, 170 (1985).  The experimenters asked forced-choice conservation ques-
tions.  Id.
100. Id. at 171.
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peated.101  Studying six-year-olds, Neilson and colleagues asked two number
conservation questions either before manipulating the objects or afterward. 102
While children changed their answers about half the time in the standard ex-
periment, six percent did so when the question was repeated without the trans-
formation.103  Repetition alone does not clearly convey to children that their an-
swer is wrong; rather, something else must occur to suggest that a different
answer is appropriate.104
The history of Piaget’s original research and the research it spawned teaches
important lessons about the application of research to real-world cases.  Clearly,
young children can be led by the interviewing context to change their answers,
but repetition does not appear to be inherently leading.  Rather, one must ex-
amine the context in which repetition occurs.  In one review of this and more
recent research, Poole and White note that “[i]t is safe to assume that repetition
effects will not be uniform but will be dependent on variables that alter wit-
nesses’ interpretations of repeated requests.”105  For legal decision-makers ana-
lyzing children’s reports of abuse, the nature of those variables is as important
as more general observations regarding the risks of repetition.
D. The Type of Questions and the Age of the Child
If one examines the entire corpus of research on repeated questions, the
findings may appear inconsistent.  Some studies find age differences only for
younger children, whereas other studies find age differences across childhood.
It is possible to derive a general rule, however.  As questions become less lead-
ing, repetition has less of an effect, and even young children’s responses are
quite consistent; as questions become more leading, repetition has larger ef-
fects, and differences between children emerge at older ages.  In assessing the
effects of repetition, it is important to consider both the types of questions
asked and the age of the child.
Preschool children are particularly suggestible.106  In Larson, the child was
not quite four years old when she was questioned by the physician’s assistant,
making research on preschool children relevant to that case.  Ceci and Fried-
man warn, however, that the results of suggestibility research with preschool
101. Id.
102. See Irene Neilson, Julie Dockrell & Jim McKechnie, Does Repetition of the Question Influence
Children’s Performance in Conservation Tasks?, 1 BRIT. J. DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 163 (1983).
103. Id. at 166-67.  The authors asked forced-choice questions.
104. Not only is it necessary to manipulate the objects between questions, but it is necessary that the
objects be manipulated by the experimenter.  McGarrigle and Donaldson, studying eighty four- to
six-year-olds, showed that if someone other than the experimenter manipulated the objects (a
“naughty” teddy bear), children were not influenced by repetition of a forced-choice question (“Are
there more here or more here or are they both the same number?”).  See James McGarrigle & Marga-
ret Donaldson, Conservation Accidents, 3 COGNITION 341 (1974).
105. Poole & White, Tell Me Again, supra note 92, at 37.  See also Poole & White, Question Repeti-
tion, supra note 57, at 976 (“[T]here is no uniform effect of question repetition on children’s perform-
ance.”).
106. See discussion supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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children is of questionable applicability to older children.107  Older children are
much more resistant to suggestive questions, making it necessary to increase the
suggestiveness of interviewing to elicit errors and demonstrate age differences
in performance.
The precise meaning of  “suggestive question” is unclear.108  Perhaps it is
most useful to think of questions along a continuum: On one end of the contin-
uum the child provides the details, whereas on the other end the interviewer
provides the details.  If the child is asked to supply all the details, the questions
are less leading.  As the questions move toward the interviewer-supplied end of
the continuum, they become more leading.  At the extreme end of the inter-
viewer-supplied continuum would be statements by the interviewer telling the
child what occurred.
Questions that ask for free recall are the least leading.  With free recall, the
interviewer  asks something such as “What happened?”, letting the child supply
all the details.  With recognition questions, the interviewer provides choices and
the child selects the correct choice.  Recognition questions include yes/no ques-
tions and forced-choice questions, whereby the child chooses one of the offered
responses (for example, “Was it A or B?”).  In either case, the interviewer sup-
plies details that the child confirms or rejects.
Between free recall and recognition questions are cued recall questions,
which focus the child’s attention on a particular type of acceptable answer, but
allow the child to fill in the details.  These include wh- questions (questions that
begin with “what”, “where”, “when”, “who”, “why”, or “how”), which are often
classified as “general” or “specific.”  As wh- questions become more specific,
the interviewer supplies more of the details.  For example, compare “what was
the man wearing?” (more general) with “what color were the man’s shoes?”
(more specific).  Note that in the latter example, the interviewer assumes a de-
tail (the man was wearing shoes).
When Poole and White analyzed shifts in responses across repeated yes/no
questions, they found that four-year-olds were more likely to change their an-
swers than were older subjects.  They also found, however, that school-age chil-
dren were remarkably resistant to the effects of repetition; indeed, six-year-olds
performed as well as adults.  Similarly, upon questioning the same subjects two
years after the event, Poole and White were “extremely surprised” to find no
age differences.109  By this time the youngest subjects were six years old, leading
the researchers to conclude that, across the two studies, “[s]ubjects 6-years-old
[sic]or older were able to maintain good within-session consistency on yes-no
questions.”110  Recall also that children were no more likely than adults to ulti-
107. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36, at 62 (“[t]he preschool research is of substantial use only in
cases involving preschool children.”).
108. See Lyon, New Wave, supra note 52, at 1037-42; Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36, at 62-63.
109. Poole & White, Two Years Later, supra note 85, at 851.
110. Id.
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mately conclude (after a total of six repetitions) that the ambiguous interaction
between the man and woman was harmful.111
When yes/no questions are combined with specific wh- questions (for exam-
ple, “What was she carrying when she came in?” and “What color badge was he
wearing?”), children will sometimes change their responses with repetition, but
two studies have found no age differences among school-age children in their
tendency to do so. 112  That is, younger children are less accurate than older chil-
dren (their memories are poorer), but are no more susceptible to the effects of
repeated questions.
Poole and White also asked children several general wh- questions.  The
open-ended questions were general wh- questions.  They were “general” be-
cause they called for narrative answers.  They were wh- questions because they
used “who, what, where, when, why, or how” (for example, “What did he look
like?”, “Tell me what happened when he came into the room,” and “Why did
he come into the room?”).  The researchers found no age differences in re-
sponse to these questions.113  Poole and White’s two-year followup study ob-
tained the same results.114  Similar results were obtained in two field studies by
Michael Lamb and his colleagues, who analyzed contradictions in children’s re-
sponses in real-world interviews.115
How can one apply the results of this research to the child in Larson, or to
other sexual abuse allegations?  The physician’s assistant might have asked
“Has anyone else touched you there?” or “Who has touched you there?” or, ac-
cording to the defense, “Did your daddy touch you there?”  These are yes/no or
specific wh- questions.  The research suggests that preschool children are more
inclined to change their responses when such questions are repeated than are
grade school children, but by age six children are about as resistant as older
children.
Research by Michael Lamb and others examining real-world sexual abuse
interviews has found that yes/no questions, forced-choice questions, and specific
111. See supra text accompanying note 79.
112. See Memon & Vartoukian, supra note 92, at 410 (finding no significant correlation between age
and decreased accuracy in response to repeated closed-ended yes/no and wh- questions among five- to
seven-year-olds, although repetition did not decrease accuracy across age groups); Stephen Moston,
The Suggestibility of Children in Interview Studies, 7 FIRST LANGUAGE 67, 75 (1987) (finding no signifi-
cant relation between age and decreased accuracy in response to repeated questions among six- to ten-
year-olds).
113. Poole & White, Question Repetition, supra note 57, at 980 (“Inconsistencies or retractions of
prior testimony were rare with open-ended questions, despite the fact that some subjects answered the
same question set six times.”).
114. Poole & White, Two Years Later, supra note 85, at 849 (“There was no evidence that testimony
became proportionally less accurate with repetition in Study 2.”).
115. They found that such contradictions were never elicited by repeated “invitations,” which are
questions that elicit an “open-ended response from the child” and do “not delimit the child’s focus ex-
cept in the most general way.”  Michael E. Lamb & Angèle Fauchier, The Effects of Question Type on
Self-Contradictions by Children in the Course of Forensic Interviews, APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 20, on file with author); Yael Orbach & Michael E. Lamb, The Relation-
ship Between Within-Interview Contradictions and Eliciting Interviewer Utterances, 25 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 323, 327-28 (2001).
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wh- questions predominate.116  Moreover, any interviewer’s claim that he or she
“only asked open-ended questions” is subject to doubt, given interviewers’
documented difficulties in accurately recalling the form of their questions.117
Accordingly, it is fair to assume that most repeated questions will be quite spe-
cific questions.
Researchers have more difficulty uncovering age differences among older
children in response to repeated questions, and attempt to do so by increasing
the suggestiveness of the questions.  Yes/no questions can be made more sug-
gestive by turning them into “tag questions” or “negative-term” questions.  Tag
questions are yes/no questions in which the question is expressed as a statement
followed by a phrase akin to “isn’t that true?” (for example, “Michaela also let
other children play with the duck, didn’t she?”).  Negative-term questions are
yes/no questions into which a “not” is inserted (for example, “Did you see a
gun?” becomes a negative-term question when phrased “Didn’t you see a
gun?”).  Some research finds that young children are more likely to acquiesce to
tag questions and negative-term questions than to yes/no questions.118  In the
Bonn Test of Statement Suggestibility, the interviewer reads the child a story
and then asks a series of yes/no, tag, and forced-choice questions (in which nei-
ther response is correct).119  Some of the questions are repeated immediately af-
ter they are first asked,120 and the repeated question is prefaced with a statement
such as “Are you sure?” or “Listen closely to this question again.”121  Because
the interviewer reads the story to the child, he or she knows the contents of the
story, increasing the suggestiveness of the questions.122  One of three studies ex-
116. Michael E. Lamb et al., Effects of Age and Delay on the Amount of Information Provided by
Alleged Sex Abuse Victims in Investigative Interviews, 71 CHILD DEV. 1586, 1590 (2000).
117. See Maggie Bruck, Stephen J. Ceci & Emmett Francoeur, The Accuracy of Mothers’ Memories
of Conversations With Their Preschool Children, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 89 (1999);
Michael E. Lamb, Yael Orbach, Kathleen J. Sternberg et al., Accuracy of Investigators’ Verbatim Notes
of Their Forensic Interviews with Alleged Child Abuse Victims, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 699 (2000);
Amye R. Warren & Cara E. Woodall, The Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: How Well Do Interviewers
Recall Their Interviews with Children, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 355 (1999).
118. See, e.g., Jemma Greenstock & Margaret-Ellen Pipe, Interviewing Children About Past Events:
The Influence of Peer Support and Misleading Questions, 20 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 69 (1996)
(finding that five- to seven-year-olds but not eight- to ten-year-olds acquiesce more to tag questions
than to yes/no questions); Bruck et al., supra note 42, at 139 (preschoolers more likely to acquiesce to
negative-term questions than to yes/no questions).
119. See Johann Endres, The Suggestibility of the Child Witness: The Role of Individual Differences
and Their Assessment, 1 J. CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT & WITNESS PSYCHOL. 44, 54 (1997).
120. See id. at 50-51 (“If . . . an almost literal repetition of the question follows an answer immedi-
ately, this will unmistakably express the questioner’s discontent with the first answer and his demand
that the answer be changed.”).  On the other hand, repeating a question immediately reduces the likeli-
hood that the child has forgotten her previous response.
121. Cf. Warren et al., supra note 50 (example of a repeated question is: “I: Did he ever touch you
anywhere?  C: No. I: You sure?  C: (Nods head yes).”).
122. See James M. Lampinen & Vicki L. Smith, The Incredible (and Sometimes Incredulous) Child
Witness: Child Eyewitnesses’ Sensitivity to Source Credibility Cues, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 621 (1995);
Michael P. Toglia et al., The Suggestibility of Children’s Memory: A Social-psychological and Cognitive
Interpretation, in DEVELOPMENT OF LONG-TERM RETENTION 217 (Mark L. Howe, Charles J. Brain-
erd & Valerie F. Reyna eds., 1992).
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amining children from four to ten years of age has found age differences in chil-
dren’s tendency to change their responses when questions are repeated.123
Some researchers have made repetition more leading by prefacing the re-
peated questions with the warning that the child has made a number of mis-
takes.124  Doing so increases suggestiveness in two ways.  First, telling the child
she has made mistakes indicates that the interviewer is knowledgeable.125  Sec-
ond, it explicitly pressures the child to change her response.  Sena Garven,
James Wood, and Roy Malpass have shown that if an interviewer responds
“You’re not doing good” to every negative response, and “Great.  You’re doing
excellent now” to every positive response, five- to seven-year-old children will
assent to most yes/no questions, even about fantastic events, and will elaborate
on those responses and repeat their claims during a subsequent interview.126
Seven studies have examined subjects’ susceptibility to repeated questions using
a version of Gudjonsson’s Suggestibility Scales, in which the interviewer reads
the subject a story and asks twenty questions.  The interviewer then warns the
subject that he or she made a number of mistakes and repeats the twenty ques-
tions.  Fifteen of the questions are called “suggestive”: they are either yes/no
questions that are correctly answered “no,” or forced-choice questions (for ex-
ample, “Did the woman have one or two children?”) for which neither answer
is correct.  The remaining five questions are yes/no questions that are correctly
answered “yes.”  Subjects’ tendency to change their responses with repetition of
the “suggestive” questions is called “shift,” and five of the seven studies have
found age differences in “shift” extending from seven years of age to adult-
hood.127
123. See Ingrid Candel, Harald Merckelbach & Peter Muris, Measuring Interrogative Suggestibility
in Children: Reliability and Validity of the Bonn Test of Statement Suggestibility, 6 PSYCHOL. CRIME &
L. 61, 67-68 (2000) (finding a significant relation between age and shift in response to repeated ques-
tions among four- to ten-year-olds).  Cf. Endres, supra note 119, at 55 (finding no significant correlation
between age and shift in response to repeated questions among four- to ten-year-olds); Endres, Pog-
genpohl & Erben, supra note 60, at 135 (same; four- to seven-year-olds).
124. See, e.g., Amye Warren, Katherine Hulse-Trotter & Ernest C. Tubbs, Inducing Resistance to
Suggestibility in Children, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 273, 278 (1991) (noting that subjects “were informed
that they had not performed very well and that it would be necessary to go through the questions once
more.”).
125. See id. at 284 (“One major drawback of our study in attempting to generalize to actual legal
situations is the fact that our interrogator knew more about the event than the ‘witnesses’ them-
selves.”).
126. Garven et al., Allegations of Wrongdoing, supra note 44.
127. See A.K. Buhrman & A.R. Warren, Reducing Suggestibility in Normal and Learning Disabled
Child Witnesses, Paper presented at the Third International Conference on Practical Aspects of Mem-
ory, College Park, Maryland (Aug. 1994) (on file with author) (noting that seven-year-olds had higher
scores on shift than fifteen-year-olds); Gudbjorg Danielsdottir, Sigrun Sigurgeirsdottir, Helma R. Ei-
narsdottir & Erlendur Haraldsson, Interrogative Suggestibility in Children and Its Relationship with
Memory and Vocabulary, 14 PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 499 (1993) (studying six-
year-olds, eight-year-olds, ten-year-olds, and twelve-year-olds and finding no age differences in shift);
G. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS & TESTIMONY 143 (1992)
(discussing two studies and finding eleven- to sixteen-year-old boys had higher scores on shift than
adults); Lucy A. Henry & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Eyewitness Memory and Suggestibility in Children with
Mental Retardation,  104 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 491, 499 (1999) (finding no difference in shift
between seven-year-olds and eleven-year-olds, but mentally retarded eleven-year-olds score higher on
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What about children younger than four years?  The research on repeated
questions has focused on children four years or older, whereas researchers have
found dramatic differences between three- and four-year-olds on tasks that
have implications for children’s performance as witnesses.128  Because the child
in Larson was just turning four when she first alleged abuse, she might have
been especially vulnerable to repetition.  Matthew Scullin and Stephen Ceci
tested the Video Suggestibility Scale for Children (“Video SSC”) with three- to
five-year-old children.129  Children watched a five-minute video about a birthday
party.  They were subsequently asked eighteen yes/no questions.  Twice they
were told, “You missed a few of the questions.  Let’s go through them again and
see if you can do better this time,” and questions were repeated.130  One unex-
pected finding was that the three-year-olds changed their answers in response to
negative feedback less often than did the four- and five-year-olds.131
Review of the research on repeated questions reveals the importance of
paying close attention to the types of questions asked and the ages of the chil-
dren tested.  When interviewers ask yes/no and wh- questions, preschool chil-
dren are more inclined to change their responses than are older children, but
even young grade school children are remarkably consistent.  When interview-
ers move to more suggestive techniques, repetition has a stronger effect, and
age differences appear among older children.  The Scullin and Ceci study, how-
ever, reveals that the relationship between age and performance is not a simple
one.  It may be that children initially become more vulnerable to external pres-
sure as they approach grade school, but that this vulnerability lessens with age.
Sometimes suggestibility effects may be due to the type of question asked
rather than to repetition.  Reviewers often cite the work of William Cassel and
colleagues as demonstrating that “children will change their answers to re-
peated forced-choice questions.”132  The researchers make it quite clear, how-
ever, that they did not simply repeat questions, but asked different questions.  In
shift than seven-year-olds); G. Richardson, G.H. Gudjonsson & T.P. Kelly, Interrogative Suggestibility
in an Adolescent Forensic Population, 18 J. ADOLESCENCE 211 (1995) (finding adolescents score higher
on shift than adults); Warren, Hulse-Trotter & Tubbs, supra note 124 (studying seven-year-olds,
twelve-year-olds and adults and finding all groups significantly different on shift, and finding that
seven-year-olds were more likely to change responses to “non-suggestive” yes/no questions, whereas
twelve-year-olds and adults performed comparably).
128. See Saywitz & Lyon, supra note 38.
129. Matthew H. Scullin & Stephen J. Ceci, A Suggestibility Scale for Children, 30 PERSONALITY &
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 843 (2001).
130. Id. at 847-49.
131. See id. at 853.  The authors speculated that three-year-olds might have had difficulty holding in
mind what they had responded and what the interviewer wanted them to respond.  See id.
132. Garven et al., More Than Suggestion, supra note 44, at 349 (citing William S. Cassel et al., De-
velopmental Patterns of Eyewitness Responses to Repeated and Increasingly Suggestive Questions, 61 J.
EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 116 (1996)); Ceci & Bruck, Suggestibility, supra note 57, at 419
(“42% of kindergarten children changed their minds on repeated questioning.”) (citing W.S. Cassel &
D.F. Bjorklund, Age Difference and Suggestibility of Eyewitnesses, in Children’s Memory for Real
World Events: Implications for Testimony, Symposium conducted at the annual Conference for Human
Development (Apr. 1992), subsequently published as William S. Cassel & David F. Bjorklund, Devel-
opmental Patterns of Eyewitness Memory and Suggestibility: An Ecologically Based Short-Term Longi-
tudinal Study, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 507 (1995)).
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one study, for example, the authors found that kindergartners were more likely
than older children and adults to change their answers when asked “increasingly
suggestive” tag questions.133  The poor performance of the kindergarten children
could be attributed to the form of the second question, rather than repetition.134
Although there was no evidence in Larson that the physician’s assistant
went beyond repeating a yes/no question, critics of interviewing will point out
that in surveys of real-world interviews, about ten percent of the questions are
“suggestive,” which includes tag-questions and questions that presuppose in-
formation not provided by the child (“suppositional” questions).135  Moreover,
Warren, Garven, Walker, and Woodall found that two-thirds of all investigative
interviews they reviewed contained at least one “negative consequence,” which
was defined as “[c]riticizing or disagreeing with a child’s statement, or otherwise
indicating that the statement is incomplete, inadequate, or disappointing.”136
Overall, four percent of the interviewers’ statements were categorized as “nega-
tive consequences.”137  Hence, some of the repeated questions in real-world in-
terviews are going to be more coercive than, for example, the yes/no questions
in the Poole and White studies.
The crux of the debate is whether real-world interviews rise to the level of
coerciveness employed in the studies that produce dramatic suggestibility ef-
fects.138  Ceci and Friedman argue that a single leading question can taint an in-
terview,139 but do not cite any research for this proposition.  Research docu-
133. Cassel et al., supra note 132, at 127.  See also Cassel & Bjorklund, supra note 132 (first question
was a tag question suggesting the correct answer (“positive leading”), whereas the second question was
a tag question suggesting an incorrect answer (“negative leading”)).
134. Ceci & Bruck, Children’s Testimony, supra note 49, at 740 (discussing Cassel & Bjorklund: “If
[the children studied] did not fall sway to the lead, then they were asked a more suggestive follow-up
question.”); CECI & BRUCK, JEOPARDY, supra note 64, at 120 (discussing Cassel & Bjorklund).  Fivush
and Schwarzmueller cite Laumann and Elliot as finding that “[w]hen the same questions were asked
again, subjects tended to change their answers more frequently than when different questions were
asked.”  Fivush & Schwarzmueller, supra note 63, at 568 (citing L.A. Laumann & R. Elliot, Reporting
What You Have Seen: Effects Associated with Age and Mode of Questioning on Eyewitness Reports, 75
PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 799 (1992)).  Although Laumann and Elliot found that children who
“were asked two sets of the same leading questions were significantly more suggestible on the second
set of questions than were those who were asked two opposing sets of leading questions,” Laumann &
Elliot, supra, at 810-11, the effect was not attributable to the negative effects of repetition, but rather to
the positive effects of asking “opposing sets” of questions.  That is, children who were asked two sets of
leading questions were not more suggestible on the second set than on the first, whereas children who
were asked two sets of opposing leading questions were less suggestible on the second set than on the
first.  Id.at 811.
135. See Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36, at 66-67 (summarizing research by Michael Lamb and his
colleagues); Lyon, New Wave, supra note 52, at 1035-36 (same).
136. Warren et al., supra note 50.  The examples included saying to a non-responsive child, “We
have to know, what did [he] do to you,” coupled with “Well what’s the truth, you haven’t told us any-
thing,” and an interviewer saying to the child “But we were talking about [the suspect].  This is [the
suspect] and what does [he] do? [pause] G’s gonna take your milkshake away.”  Note that in both cases
the negative consequences were paired with open-ended wh- questions.
137. See id.
138. Compare Lyon, New Wave, supra note 52, with Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36.
139. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36, at 68 (“Given Lamb’s narrow definition of suggestion as a
statement implying a favored reply from the child, even a single instance could call into doubt the va-
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menting high rates of suggestibility inevitably tests interviews containing high
proportions of extremely suggestive questions.  Clearly, there is a substantial
difference between rewarding every “yes” response and punishing every “no”
response (the Garven study on the effects of positive and negative conse-
quences),140 and expressing disappointment four percent of the time.
E. Memory and Certainty
Children with stronger memories are less susceptible to repeated questions.
Several of the studies discussed in the previous section found that children who
recalled more were less likely to change their answers to repeated questions.141
Christine Ricci and Carol Beal repeated wh- questions (general, specific, and
suppositional) and found that “none of the children who were initially accurate
later answered inaccurately when the question was repeated a second time.”142
The effects of certainty were anticipated by the Piagetian research on children’s
understanding of number: Gelman and her colleagues found that if children
counted an array of objects three times rather than once (thus increasing their
confidence in their answer), they were less swayed by a suggestive request to
count again.143
The effects of memory strength suggest that children will be less likely to
change their responses when the repeated questions concern central details or
major events rather than peripheral details or minor events.144  Indeed, if the
questions involve highly salient and memorable details, repetition may have no
effect whatsoever.  April Schwarzmueller found that four- to six-year-olds were
impervious to twice repeated wh- and yes/no questions about their interactions
with a “wizard,” and speculated that this was because “children were active par-
lidity of an interview—and all the more so the five to ten such instances that are typical of the inter-
views Lamb studied.”).
140. Garven et al., Allegations of Wrongdoing, supra note 44.
141. See Candel, Merckelbach & Muris, supra note 123, at 66 (Bonn Test of Statement Suggestibil-
ity: shift negatively related to memory performance on free recall test); Endres, Poggenpohl & Erben,
supra note 60, at 135 (repeating story had significant effect on reducing effects of repetition (forty-three
percent to twenty-nine percent), although authors characterize effect as “weak”); Henry & Gudjons-
son, supra note 127, at 499 (Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale: differences between mentally retarded
children and nonretarded children on shift disappeared after controlling for the effects of initial mem-
ory); Warren, Hulse-Trotter & Tubbs, supra note 124, at 281 (Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale:
“[C]ontrolling for initial memory (free recall) resulted in nonsignificant correlations between age and
all other variables”).  See also Fivush & Schwarzmueller, supra note 63, at 569 (discussing Warren,
Hulse-Trotter & Tubbs’s findings: “[t]his suggests that when the initial memory is good, children and
adults are less likely to change their answers to repeated questions than when the initial memory is
poor”).  But see Endres, supra note 119, at 55 (Bonn Test of Statement Suggestibility: shift unrelated to
free recall); Endres, Poggenpohl & Erben, supra note 60, at 135 (same); Scullin & Ceci, supra note 129,
at 853 (Video Suggestibility Scale for Children: non-significant correlation between shift and recall).
142. Ricci & Beal, supra note 92, at 135.
143. R. Gelman, E. Meck & S. Merkin, Young Children’s Numerical Competence, 1 COGNITIVE
DEV. 1, 10 (1986) (“Children in the . . . group benefitted somewhat from their prior counting experi-
ence [of counting three times].”).
144. Poole & White, Question Repetition, supra note 57, at 976 (noting that repetition effects proba-
bly depend on “the nature of the material to be reported (central events or details)”).
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ticipants” and the activities were “enjoyable and engaging for the child.”145  The
reader should recall, however, that even when a child’s memory of an event is
quite weak, repetition does not guarantee inconsistency.  In Poole and White’s
follow-up study, six-year-olds asked about a minute-long interaction that had
occurred two years previously were just as consistent across repeated yes/no
questions as were the older children and adults.
F. Inconsistency Versus Error
The fact that children with poorer memories are more likely to change their
responses when questions are repeated raises the issue of whether repetition in-
creases error.  If repetition leads children to change their wrong answers as well
as their right answers, then repetition need not increase error.  If children are
more likely to change wrong answers than right answers, then repetition could
decrease error.  If repetition leads children to refuse to respond altogether or to
respond “I don’t know,” then repetition could decrease accuracy without in-
creasing error.
Evidence that repetition increases error is remarkably hard to find.  As
noted above, repeated open-ended questions do not decrease accuracy.  With
respect to yes/no questions, Poole and White could not calculate accuracy for
the repeated question, “Did the man hurt Melanie?”, because subjects could
reasonably answer “yes” or “no,” and they do not report accuracy for the re-
peated yes/no question, “Did the man ask nicely for the pen?”146  Similarly,
Warren and her colleagues do not report error rates across repeated yes/no
questions.147  A follow-up study to Warren’s, in which the authors used a similar
method to examine the performance of learning disabled children in response
to repeated yes/no questions, found no decrease in accuracy.148  Finally, Ricci
and Beal showed five-year-olds a three-minute slide show in which a camera
was stolen.  Error rates were unaffected by repeated questions, which included
“suggestive” wh- questions (“What about the dog, what kind of dog was at the
picnic?”, when there was no dog) and specific wh- questions (“What color was
the ball the boys were throwing?”).149
Although an “I don’t know” response is not informative, it is not inaccurate
either.  Summarizing Stephen Moston’s study of the effects of repeated yes/no
and specific wh- questions on six- to ten-year-olds,150 Ceci and Bruck emphasize
that Moston found that “[t]he number of correct responses significantly de-
145. April Schwarzmueller, The Effects of Repeated Questioning on Children’s Memory For an
Event, Poster presented at the biennial meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development,
Washington, DC (Apr. 3-6, 1997) (copy on file with author).
146. Poole & White, Question Repetition, supra note 57, at 980-84.
147. Warren, Hulse-Trotter & Tubbs, supra note 124.  Warren and her colleagues used the Gud-
jonsson Suggestibility Scale, id. at 276, which classifies a “yes” or a “no” to a “don’t know” or vice-versa
as a shift.  See also Gisli H. Gudjonsson, A New Scale of Interrogative Suggestibility, 5 PERSONALITY &
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 303, 306 (1984).
148. Buhrman & Warren, supra note 127, at 14-15.
149. Ricci & Beal, supra note 92, at 131-33.
150. Moston, supra note 112.
LYON_FMT.DOC 12/05/01  11:25 AM
122 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 65: No. 1
clined from the first question to the second question.”151  Other researchers,
however, have noted that the number of incorrect responses did not increase.152
This pattern of results is easily explained by an increase in “I don’t know” re-
sponses153 and by a shift from one incorrect response to another.154  Young chil-
dren are notoriously reluctant to answer “I don’t know,” at least to yes/no ques-
tions,155 but if the effects of repetition are small, then even a few “I don’t know”s
may affect the results of a study.  Studying five- to eight-year-olds’ responses to
repeated specific wh- and yes/no questions about a five-minute event, Amina
Memon and Rita Vartoukian excluded the “I don’t know”s from their data
151. Ceci & Bruck, Suggestibility, supra note 57, at 420.
152. See Moston, supra note 112, at 77 (“[R]epeated questioning did not significantly affect the
mean percentage of incorrect responses given.”); Fivush & Schwarzmueller, supra note 63, at 569
(“[R]epeating the same questions within a single interview session does not increase [the] amount of
incorrect information.”).  Cf.  Poole & White, Question Repetition, supra note 57, at 976 (“Moston
(1987) found that repetition within a single interrogation reduced the number of correct but not the
number of incorrect replies for children age 6-10.”).
153. See Fivush & Schwarzmueller, supra note 63, at 569 (“[R]ather than changing their response
when asked the same question again, children at all ages tended to give a don’t-know response.”).
Moston’s finding that repetition led children to claim ignorance appears to conflict with the claim that
repetition decreases children’s apparent uncertainty.  Discussing Poole and White’s initial study, Ceci
and Bruck argued that
[w]hen children were asked a specific question about a detail for which they had no informa-
tion (i.e., “What did the man do for a living?”), many answered with sheer speculations.  Fur-
thermore, both children and adults used fewer qualifiers with repeated questions (they omit-
ted phrases such as “it might have been”) and consequently sounded more confident about
their statements.  These findings illustrate the danger of repeatedly asking specific questions:
Children will often cooperate by guessing but after several repetitions, their uncertainty is no
longer apparent.
Ceci & Bruck, Children’s Testimony, supra note 49, at 740.  Ceci and Bruck overlooked several impor-
tant findings.  For example, dropping uncertainty qualifiers is problematic only if the response is incor-
rect.  If one becomes more certain about one’s correct responses with repetition, this is a good thing.
Yet when Poole and White analyzed incorrect responses, “there was no tendency for subjects as a
whole to increase or decrease their use of uncertainty qualifiers.  Thus, there is no evidence that ques-
tion repetition encouraged subjects to speculate more or less than they did when first describing the
event.”  Poole & White, Question Repetition, supra note 57, at 980.  In their follow-up study, Poole and
White reported a decrease in uncertainty qualifiers with repetition (for both the original and the follow-
up study), but included both correct and incorrect responses, thus making it impossible to determine
whether the result is an argument against repetition.  See Poole & White, Two Years Later, supra note
85, at 848.  Ceci and Bruck emphasize children’s tendency to speculate about the man’s occupation.
But in their initial study, Poole and White found that adults were more likely than children to speculate.
Poole & White, Question Repetition, supra note 57, at 981 (“[A]dults speculated more frequently than
did the children.”).  In the two-year follow-up, the researchers found the reverse tendency: Children
speculated more frequently than the adults, and the researchers suggest that this was due to the chil-
dren’s weak memory for a one-minute interaction they had witnessed two years previously.  Poole &
White, Two Years Later, supra note 85, at 850, 852.  Moreover, the researchers did indeed find de-
creased uncertainty when this question was repeated in the original study, but the effect was attribut-
able to six subjects, five of whom were adults.  Poole & White, Question Repetition, supra note 57, at
981-82.  Hence, out of eighty-six children tested, one exhibited increased confidence over repeated
questions.  In sum, the Poole and White studies provide only mixed support for the claim that children
are particularly vulnerable to appearing more certain of their responses when questions are repeated.
154. See Moston, supra note 112, at 77 (“If a child is guessing the answer to a question, then he or
she is probably just as likely to get it wrong the first time of asking as the second time.”).
155. See Poole & White, Tell Me Again, supra note 92, at 40; Debra Ann Poole & D. Stephen Lind-
say, Children’s Eyewitness Reports After Exposure to Misinformation From Parents, 7 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 27, 36 (2001) (yes/no questions).
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(about five percent of all responses) and found small and statistically insignifi-
cant differences in accuracy across repeated open-ended or closed-ended ques-
tions.156  In sum, because children may change their wrong answers to right an-
swers or may respond “I don’t know,” repetition may increase inconsistency
without increasing error.
G. Applying the Research
Given what is now known about the effects of repetition on young children’s
reports, what conclusions can be made about Larson?  On the one hand, one
can argue that the child’s statements are unreliable.  The child was barely four
years old when questioned.  The physician’s assistant failed to ask open-ended
questions.  One might presume suggestiveness, based on the post-divorce timing
of the allegation, and the failure of the physician’s assistant to record the inter-
view.157
Nonetheless, any expert opinion that the child would be “likely” to change
her response simply because the physician’s assistant repeated the question
would be unwarranted.  The expert might argue that the child would be “more
likely than an adult” to change her response, but would have to acknowledge
that this conclusion was solely attributable to the girl’s age.  No one contended
that the event was ambiguous; indeed, the physician’s assistant suspected inno-
cent touching and asked questions to test this hypothesis.  No one argued that
the child’s memory of interactions with her father were weak, or that the event
was somehow peripheral or unimportant.  No one argued that the physician’s
assistant asked tag questions (“He touched your vagina, didn’t he?”) or suppo-
sitional questions (“When did your daddy touch your vagina?”).  Rather, the
defense contended that she asked yes/no questions, whereas the prosecution ar-
gued that she asked wh- questions.  The research suggests that a four-year-old
child in this girl’s situation will stand firm rather than make a false allegation in
the face of a repeated question.
The child did not stand firm, however; she changed her story when the ques-
tion was repeated.  Is this not proof of inconsistency and evidence for error?
This last argument raises an important question: If repetition leads to inconsis-
tency, why should interviewers ever repeat questions?  Or, to put it another
way, why shouldn’t repetition that results in inconsistency always be evidence of
unreliability?  The answer highlights what is almost always missing from the re-
search on suggestibility.
156. Memon & Vartoukian, supra note 92, at 409 (“The effect of trial on accuracy of responses to
open questions fell short of statistical significance.”), 410 (closed-ended questions: “Again, the effect of
trial fell short of statistical significance.”).
157. Cf. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36, at 101-02 n.289 (suggesting that courts might allow expert
testimony on suggestibility when the state fails to videotape a formal interview or when a case arises in
the context of a particularly acrimonious divorce).
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THE NEGLECTED ERROR: FALSE DENIALS OF ABUSE
A common-sense explanation for the child’s inconsistency in Larson is that
she was reluctant to reveal what her father had done to her.  The physician’s as-
sistant testified that when she first asked the child if anyone had touched her,
the child “looked down and away from me and averted her eyes.”158  It was only
after the question was repeated that the child described how “Daddy” had
touched her “between the legs” with “his bone” that “came out of his pants.” 159
When left alone with her mother, the child claimed that she was “only kidding,”
but when the assistant returned she repeated the allegation and explained that
“she didn’t want to have her father in trouble.”160  In a subsequent interview she
described abuse that had occurred in “her Daddy’s house,” but refused to name
the perpetrator because “she loved her Daddy and she didn’t want him to get
into trouble.”161
The possibility that abused children may be reluctant to disclose their abuse
may come as no surprise.  It is, however, the subject of intense debate among
suggestibility researchers.  Reviewing the research in a recent issue of American
Psychologist, the house organ of the American Psychological Association,
Bruck, Ceci, and Hembrooke characterized the belief that sexually abused chil-
dren are reluctant to disclose abuse when directly questioned as a “stubborn
urban legend.”162  In their prominent book-length review of research on chil-
dren’s suggestibility, Ceci and Bruck characterized the belief that threats deter
sexually abused children from reporting abuse as “professional ‘lore.’”163  If they
are correct, and abused children are forthcoming about abuse, there is no justi-
fication for repeating questions in order to encourage a child to reveal abuse.
Moreover, if a child reveals abuse only after prompting, this would be strong
evidence that the allegation is false, because a truly abused child would not re-
quire such prompting.
If the researchers are wrong, however, and some children are reluctant to
reveal abuse, then repeating a question may increase the number of truly
abused children who will reveal their abuse when questioned.  A substantial
body of both observational and laboratory research demonstrates that the so-
called urban legends and lore about children’s reluctance to reveal abuse are
true. 164  Children are reluctant to disclose abuse.  Responding to my claims, Ceci
158. Respondent’s Brief on Remand from the United States Supreme Court at 6, State v. Larson,
453 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1990) (No. C2-88-2379).
159. State v. Larson, 472 N.W.2d 120, 122 (Minn. 1991).
160. Id.
161. State v. Larson, 453 N.W.2d 42, 44 (Minn. 1990).
162. Bruck, Ceci & Hembrooke, supra note 42, at 138.
163. CECI & BRUCK, JEOPARDY, supra note 64, at 300.
164. See Thomas D. Lyon, Scientific Support for Expert Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accom-
modation, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (Jon Conte ed., forthcoming 2001), available at http://hal-law.usc.
edu/users/tlyon/articles/csaas-rev.PDF [hereinafter Lyon, Scientific Support]; Lyon, New Wave, supra
note 52, at 1046-68.
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and Friedman have acknowledged that “fear, embarrassment or loyalty may in-
hibit a child from disclosing abuse,”165 and that “in some circumstances these
considerations might make it reasonable to use suggestive questioning.”166
Moreover, they have reviewed the suggestibility research and concluded that
“[t]here is no serious doubt that directed questioning will often be far more ef-
fective than requests for free recall in securing disclosure of abuse.”167
What effect does repetition have on reluctant children?  Sadly, the effect is
unknown.  Suggestibility researchers have virtually ignored the extent to which
suggestive techniques may overcome reluctance to report, at the same time ac-
knowledging that any decision about the efficacy of an interviewing technique
requires a consideration of the number of true accusations that the technique
will elicit weighed against the number of false allegations that will occur.168
Children in the studies on question repetition have little or no motive to conceal
information, minimizing the likelihood that the research will reveal any positive
effects of repetition.
There is a substantial body of laboratory research examining children’s re-
luctance to disclose minor transgressions and embarrassing events.169  Although
none of the studies has examined the effects of repeated questions, there is evi-
dence that techniques criticized as “leading” increase disclosure-specific yes/no:
questions instead of invitations,170 for example, or reassurance that it is “O.K.”
to tell. 171  In order to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of repeated questions,  it is
necessary to know whether repeated questions will increase the likelihood that
a truly abused child will reveal abuse, as may have happened in Larson.
165. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 36, at 45.
166. Id. at 78.
167. Id. at 46.  Ceci and Friedman then point out that children’s reluctance to disclose abuse can re-
duce the probative value of abuse allegations.  Using the logic of Bayes’ theorem, they show that “all
other things being equal, the less probable it is that the child would report abuse if it occurred, the less
probative is a report that she does make.”  Id. at 78.  However, “all other things” are not equal; many of
the factors that make truly abused children reluctant to reveal abuse also make non-abused children
reluctant to allege abuse.  For example, consider the fact that grade school children undergoing genital
examinations are less likely to recall genital touch than other forms of touch.  If “all other things” are
equal, this would mean that a report of genital touch is less likely to be true than a report of non-genital
touch.  The same factor that suppresses true reports of genital touch (embarrassment), however, also
makes gradeschool children less likely to make false claims of genital touch than less embarrassing
forms of touch.
168. See CECI & BRUCK, JEOPARDY, supra note 64, at 2 (“[I]t is important to determine the propor-
tion of abused children who are initially too scared or confused to divulge the details of their victimiza-
tion, but who will eventually do so if they are questioned more aggressively, as well as the proportion of
nonabused children who will eventually disclose false details of abuse if they are aggressively ques-
tioned.”).
169. See Lyon, New Wave, supra note 52; Lyon, Scientific Support, supra note 164.
170. See, e.g., J. Clare Wilson & Margaret-Ellen Pipe, The Effects of Cues on Young Children’s Re-
call of Real Events, 18 N.Z. J. PSYCHOL. 65 (1989); Karen J. Saywitz et al., Children’s Memories of a
Physical Examination Involving Genital Touch: Implications for Reports of Child Sexual Abuse, 59 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 682 (1991).
171. See Thomas D. Lyon & Joyce S. Dorado, Does the Oath Matter? Motivating Maltreated Chil-
dren to Tell the Truth, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Society,
Denver, Colo. (June 3-6, 1999) (on file with author).
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CONCLUSION
A careful review of the literature on repeated questions leaves one very
skeptical about the value of the research for a case-by-case analysis of the reli-
ability of a child’s statements.  The evidence that repetition undermines accu-
racy is weaker than it first appears, and the ways that repetition may increase
accuracy have been ignored.
This paper is a cautionary tale for courts that find themselves confronted
with claims about the reliability of children’s statements.  Changes in the law of
hearsay make it likely that in future sexual abuse cases courts will assume more
responsibility for assessing reliability.  At the same time, the research on chil-
dren’s suggestibility continues to grow, and more frequently appears in places
likely to be noticed by the courts.  Moreover, there appears to be a trend to-
ward greater acceptance of defense expert testimony on suggestibility.172  Un-
doubtedly, the research on suggestibility has done a lot of good.  It has dis-
abused many professionals of simplistic and over-optimistic assumptions about
the possibility of false allegations.  It has led to a tremendous effort to develop
non-suggestive protocols for interviewing children about abuse.  It has uncov-
ered cases in which highly coercive interviewing techniques have terrorized
purported child victims and potentially generated convictions of the innocent.
In the wrong hands, however, the research can also cause great harm.  Ad-
versarial battles are particularly likely to generate polarized and exaggerated
claims about what science has proven.  Without any evidence about the poten-
tially beneficial effects of repetition on truly abused children, a court consulting
suggestibility experts would only hear about the dangers of repeated questions.
In Larson, the common sense interpretation of the young child’s initial denial of
abuse as reluctance might well be dismissed as an “urban legend” or layperson’s
“lore.”  Moreover, because of the difficulties of communicating complicated
and often conflicting findings, many experts would feel compelled to simplify
the literature, making it understandable to a lay audience.  Simple statements
about young children’s unreliability when questions are repeated, however, are
more likely to mislead than to educate.
172. See Lyon, Expert Testimony, supra note 68.
